16 maggio 2018: Franz Dietrich: A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning
Franz Dietrich (Paris School of Economics)
A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning
16 maggio 2018, h. 14:00-15:30
Sala "Enzo Paci" — Direzione del Dipartimento di Filosofia, Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano.
John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account, thereby providing a unified model of rationality and reasoning. Our model focuses on the agent's mental states - the beliefs, intentions, preferences etc. - and their revision through reasoning. This puts psychology into the centre, against the behaviourist tradition in economics. We then address Broome's key question of whether reasoning helps in becoming rational. Does reasoning for instance help us acquire transitive or acyclic preferences, consistent or deductively closed beliefs, and non-akratic intentions? We identify three types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. This taxonomy includes most rationality requirements ever put forward. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning helps for achieving closedness requirements, but not for achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We apply our findings to the dilemma of Buridan's ass, and identify a problem in Broome's solution to it.
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