6 marzo 2017: E. Sacchi: Intentionality and Aspectuality. What Does Phenomenal Character Ground?
Elisabetta Sacchi (San Raffaele, Milan).
Intentionality and Aspectuality. What Does Phenomenal Character Ground?
6 marzo 2017, ore 10:30-12:30
Sala Enzo Paci, Direzione del Dipartimento di Filosofia.
Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano
La conferenza si terrà in inglese.
La partecipazione è fortemente raccomandata agli allievi del Scuola di Dottorato in Filosofia e Scienze dell’Uomo.
Tutti gli interessati sono invitati a partecipare.
The issue of the connection between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness is pivotal in the current debate in the philosophy of mind. According to a position that is gaining more and more credence among scholars, intentionality is explanatorily dependent on consciousness. This is labelled the “phenomenal intentionality thesis” (PIT). According to PIT, intentionality has its source/is grounded in the phenomenal character of conscious mental states. In my talk I shall discuss PIT in its two possible readings. According to one reading what phenomenal character grounds is a kind of intentionality, according to the other reading what it grounds is a kind of content. I shall make two main claims: one negative and one positive. The negative claim is that phenomenal character is not the source either of a kind of intentionality or of a kind of content. The positive claim is that even though phenomenal character is not the source of a kind of intentionality, it is the source of a kind of aspectuality. According to the picture I shall bring forward, aspectuality is not a unitary phenomenon, but comes in many different varieties. One of these varieties is precisely conscious aspectuality, the kind of aspectuality that is grounded in the phenomenal character of a state.